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Introduction
If the United Nations always succeeded or never succeeded in preventing atrocity crimes, then 
there would be no point in trying to improve its performance. Instead, its track record has been 
remarkably uneven. Its quiet successes at preventing mass violence have been more than matched 
by horrific and well-publicized failures to prevent (or protect).1 Though it is impossible to measure 
prevention with any degree of certainty, it appears that the world body has, on occasion, made a 
positive difference.2 So, it has potential. But, in too many situations, that potential has not been 
realized. This essay asks why the UN’s preventive efforts have been so inconsistent and how some 
of the shortcomings in its performance might be remedied.
At the outset, this paper makes three assumptions. One, over the years, the United Nations has 
been no worse at preventing mass atrocities than have been regional and sub-regional organizations, 
governments, and/or civil society. Two, when prevention has worked, it has generally been because 
there has been productive collaboration among actors of these various types and levels, so credit 
or blame should be shared. Three, nevertheless, mediocrity on any actor’s part is not an acceptable 
standard when it comes to an issue of public policy with such existential implications for human 
life.  
This essay argues further 1) that the United Nations has a unique combination of assets that 
could be put to much better use in this area, 2) that shortcomings in its performance arise as much 
from conceptual misunderstandings and institutional dysfunction as from capacity deficits, 3) 
that these shortcomings have negative implications for whether and how effectively other critical 
actors respond to the atrocity prevention challenge, and 4) that steps could be taken to improve the 
situation significantly without a huge infusion of scarce resources. These points are addressed in 
the following four sections on potential, shortcomings, implications, and remedies, respectively.
Potential
International efforts to prevent mass atrocity crimes require four core elements: legitimacy, 
authority, capacity, and strategy. Legitimacy is the ability to generate and sustain political support 
on the local, national, and regional, as well as international, levels for the preventive measures being 
undertaken or contemplated and for the purposes being served. Authority, which may buttress 
legitimacy, derives from those legal instruments and institutional decision-making processes that 
confirm that those preventive actions are appropriate to the circumstances and proportional to the 
purposes being pursued. Capacity refers to having and/or mobilizing and being able to employ the 
requisite physical, material, financial, and human resources to carry out the preventive measures 
fully and effectively. Strategy relates to the ability to assess and frame the unfolding situation 
1 For the purposes of this paper, mass atrocity crimes are considered to be those identified under United Nations, General 
Assembly Resolution 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, October 24, 2005 (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1), paragraph 138, 
its discussion of the Responsibility to Protect, namely genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity. The terms atrocity and mass atrocity are used inter-changeably in this paper.  
2 In his 2015 and 2016 reports on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted 
that preventive efforts by the United Nations and its partners had helped to prevent mass atrocity crimes and/
or their escalation in Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, and Timor-Leste. United Nations, Report of the 
Secretary-General, A Vital and Enduring Commitment: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, July 13, 2015 (UN Doc. 
A/69/981-S/2015/500), para. 8; United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, Mobilizing Collective Action: The Next 
Decade of the Responsibility to Protect, July 22, 2016 (UN Doc. A/70/999-S/2016/620), paras. 33 and 55. Twelve chapters 
of the 2016 Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect are devoted to situations in which mass atrocity crimes 
occurred or were prevented. See Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne, eds., Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 693-910. Also see Naomi Kikoler, “Guinea: An Overlooked Case of the 
Responsibility to Protect in Practice,” in The Responsibility to Protect: Overcoming the Challenge of Atrocity Prevention, eds. 
Serena K. Sharma and Jennifer M. Welsh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 304-323. 
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and the players involved both in a timely manner and from an atrocity prevention perspective, 
to develop an effective plan for response to developments on the ground, to build a sustainable 
coalition of actors on all levels willing to pursue the same objectives in a mutually reinforcing 
manner, and to reassess and adjust the strategy as needed in the face of unexpected developments. 
Ultimately, prevention is not completed until steps are taken to discourage a reoccurrence of such 
threats of mass atrocities.
Legitimacy should be one of the United Nations’ prime attributes. The 193-member General 
Assembly, the world’s only virtually universal political body, has endorsed both the Genocide 
Convention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Though its decisions--other than on internal 
matters—are not legally binding, the Assembly has, from its earliest days been the world’s prime 
incubator of global norms and standards. Since 2009, the Assembly’s annual informal interactive 
dialogues on R2P have shown broad and persistent support from the Member States for the 
preventive dimensions of R2P, even as some delegations continue to express reservations about 
possible coercive measures under the third pillar of the Secretary-General’s implementation 
strategy (as crafted by this author).3 Successive Secretaries-General have produced a series of 
well-received reports on conflict prevention, something which António Guterres has pledged to 
make the centerpiece of his tenure.4 In many cases, moreover, the United Nations is more likely to 
be perceived as a disinterested actor than would neighbors or more distant but powerful states. 
Perceptions of impartiality should bolster claims to legitimacy.   Multilateral measures are generally 
assumed to be more legitimate than unilateral ones, as long as the measures undertaken by the UN 
(or a regional body) are not perceived as being manipulated by a few powerful Member States to 
further narrow national interests.
Authority should be another advantage for the world body. Its Charter gives the United 
Nations ample legal authority for initiating preventive efforts and for building global-regional 
partnerships to do so, as well as historically unprecedented authority for undertaking multilateral 
enforcement action. Prevention is the first purpose mentioned in the Charter and Chapter VI lays 
out a wide range of non-coercive tools for preventing and resolving conflict. Chapter VIII defines 
the modalities for collaboration with regional arrangements in these pursuits, while Chapter VII 
outlines the Security Council’s unsurpassed and historically unique enforcement powers.
Though enforcement is often thought of solely in terms of coercive military action, there are 
a wide range of sanctions—relating to diplomatic, political, financial, and economic measures, as 
well as restrictions on military assistance and arms transfers—that could be employed with greatest 
effect early in a crisis for preventive and/or deterrent purposes, whether targeted on individual, 
group, or national actors. Multilateral sanctions tend to be much more persuasive than unilateral 
ones, so getting Security Council authorization can be an essential step. In the context of atrocity 
prevention, it should be recalled that the Council’s enforcement powers override the constraints on 
intervening in essentially domestic matters noted in Article 2 (7). Though the Charter is silent on 
genocide and mass atrocities, it is replete with multiple references to promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. In that regard, the Security Council has the 
authority to make referrals to the Intrnational Criminal Court (ICC), a non-UN body, concerning 
the alleged commission of atrocity crimes. In a number of situations, UN representatives have 
reminded local and national actors of this possibility.
3 In 2009, the General Assembly held both a short informal interactive dialogue and then a formal debate on the Secretary 
General’s report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, of 12 January 2009, which laid out his three-pillar strategy. 
United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, January 12, 2009 (UN Doc. 
A/63/677). This author was the architect of the strategy and the principal drafter of that report and all other statements 
and reports by the Secretary-General on R2P from 2007 to mid-2012. Each year since 2009, the Secretary-General 
has produced a report on different aspects of R2P to be addressed at informal interactive dialogues of the General 
Assembly.  The reports and summaries of the dialogues can be found on the web sites of the Global Centre on the 
Responsibility to Protect and of the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect.
4 The first major report, by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, was United Nations, Report by the Secretary-General, Prevention 
of Armed Conflict, June 7, 2001 (UN Doc. A/55/985-S/2001/574). More recently, see António Guterres,“Secretary-
General-Designate Remarks to the General Assembly on Taking the Oath of Office” (speech, New York, December 12, 
2016) United Nations.
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It is commonplace to observe that the United Nations’ claims to legitimacy and authority are 
not matched by a reliable capacity to carry out its decisions and to forward its values. There is 
much to this observation. However, this is more a commentary on its capacity for response than 
for prevention, given that a coercive response under Chapter VII requires the mobilization of the 
economic and/or military capacities of the Member States, as well as authorization by the Security 
Council. The organization’s capacities for preventive action under Chapter VI and Article 99 (see 
below)—even if only undertaken by the Secretary-General, the Secretariat, or other parts of the 
UN system—do not necessarily depend on explicit action by the Member States.  These preventive 
capacities are quite varied and broad, if not deep or robust. 
In terms of structural or upstream prevention, the UN system has a presence, whether for 
sustainable development, humanitarian, human rights, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and/or 
conflict resolution purposes, in most of the countries of potential concern. In terms of operational 
or more immediate preventive measures, when endorsing R2P at the 2005 World Summit, the 
gathered heads of State and government agreed to support the United Nations “in establishing 
an early warning capacity” and to assist States “under stress before crises and conflicts break 
out.”5 Though the Summit authorized the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) 
limited to post-conflict scenarios, it should be recalled that the initial proposal for the Commission, 
introduced by Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
in late 2004, envisioned it having an R2P-like preventive function as well. The first core function 
for the Commission, according to the High-level Panel, should be “to identify countries which are 
under stress and risk sliding towards State collapse” and “to organize, in partnership with the 
national Government, proactive assistance in preventing that process from developing further.”6 
The substantive parallels to the R2P language on assisting states under stress are striking. Yet the 
fact that the preventive dimension of the PBC was not retained in the Summit articulation of the 
purposes of the PBC is suggestive of the political hurdles that have to be overcome in some cases 
of structural and operational prevention, as well as in crafting effective responses to unfolding 
atrocities.
In terms of operational prevention, under Article 99 of the Charter the Secretary-General “may 
bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the 
maintenance of international peace and security.”7 Since 2009, this clause has increasingly been 
interpreted as including the potential commission of mass atrocity crimes, whether in statements 
to the Council by the Secretary-General, his Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide, or the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights.8 The bully pulpit that the Secretary-General and his small 
army of SRSGs (Special Advisers, Special Representatives, and Envoys) share can be critical to 
getting preventive messages to would-be perpetrators, bystanders, vulnerable populations, media, 
civil society leaders, governments, and regional arrangements. These messages have often been 
about discouraging the incitement of atrocity crimes, something which all of the world leaders 
agreed at the 2005 World Summit to prevent (paragraph 138 of the Outcome Document). In this 
author’s experience, pushing back against indications of incitement has proven to be one of the 
most flexible and timely tools in the prevention toolkit.
5 United Nations, 2005 World Summit Outcome, paras. 138 and 139, respectively.
6 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure 
World: Our Shared Responsibility, 2004 (United Nations Department of Public Information), 83, para. 264.
7 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945 (United Nations), 
article 99. 
8 The inclusion of the four R2P crimes under Article 99 was proposed by this author to the Security Council’s Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa in December 2008. This has since become common 
practice. United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 30 December 2008 from the Permanent Representative of South 
Africa Addressed to the President of the Security Council, December 31, 2008 (UN Doc. S/2008/836), 13. Also see Simon 
Chesterman, “Relations with the Secretary-General,” in The UN Security Council in the 21st Century, eds. Sebastian von 
Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Bruno Stagno Ugarte (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2016), 453. In his final report on R2P, 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted that “when the situation has required it, I have informed the Security Council 
of atrocity crime risks and urged it to take early and decisive action. My hope is that future Secretaries-General 
will continue to draw on the authority provided to them under the Charter of the United Nations.” United Nations 
Secretary-General, Mobilizing Collective Action, 11, para. 39.
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Strategy, perhaps more than the other core dimensions, is an area under construction. Though 
the General Assembly approved the Genocide Convention almost seventy years ago, the first 
UN plan to prevent genocide was not articulated until 2004 to mark the tenth anniversary of 
the Rwandan genocide (discussed more fully below).9 Since 2009, the Joint Office on Genocide 
Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect has developed an all-encompassing Framework for 
Analysis for the Prevention of Atrocity Crimes and the Secretary-General’s annual reports on 
different aspects of R2P have placed a heavy emphasis on prevention. Though the UN was late to 
framing concepts and strategies for preventing atrocity crimes, so too were governments, regional 
organizations, and academia. In the 1990s, however, the UN was at the forefront of the articulation 
of concerns about human security and human protection that continue to provide an intellectual 
and political context for atrocity prevention.10 This intellectual heritage suggests that the world 
body is in a position to develop a broader and more multilateral framework for preventing and 
responding to mass atrocity crimes beyond the narrower perspectives of some governments, much 
as it did in the case of counter-terrorism following the attacks of 9/11.  
Shortcomings
It would be tempting, but overly sweeping and simplistic, to assert that the primary reason for 
the UN’s underperformance in atrocity prevention has been because of the narrow domestic and 
geopolitical agendas of powerful Member States. This may be the case in places, such as Syria, 
Sudan, or Yemen, where the geopolitical stakes are perceived to be high and the UN’s entreaties 
have fallen on deaf ears. The UN’s preventive efforts may well have had more success in low 
profile cases on the whole than in high profile ones in which there have been more actors of 
significance. Yet the UN has done relatively well in some places, such as Kyrgyzstan and Kenya, 
where the stakes were high geopolitically and relatively poorly in others, such as Sri Lanka and 
Central African Republic, where the international stakes were modest.  
It may well be that the 193 Member States are simultaneously the greatest strength and 
the greatest weakness of the United Nations. Either way, forging their collaboration on matters 
of common concern was a founding purpose of the organization. So it is not enough for the 
Secretariat—or for capitals or civil society-- just to lament the differences among key Member 
States and declare some situations to be too politically sensitive to handle, especially when there 
appears to be an imminent threat of mass atrocity crimes. The inter-governmental bodies provide 
the mandates that the Secretariat has an obligation to implement, but the latter cannot be passive 
bystanders to the political process. Their responsibilities are not limited to narrow interpretations 
of the specific mandates they are assigned by the inter-governmental bodies. 
UN officials are obligated both to act to further the principles and purposes of the Charter 
and, as noted above, to inform the Security Council of possible threats to international peace 
and security under Article 99 of the Charter. The latter entails taking proactive steps to gather 
and assess the information needed to provide the Council and other relevant organs with 
the Secretariat’s informed and considered judgements about situations of concern. As the 
2000 Brahimi peacekeeping report famously commented, in the context of mass atrocity 
prevention, the Secretariat has an obligation to tell the Security Council what it needs to hear, not 
what it wants to hear.11 Too often, the Secretariat engages in pre-emptive self-censorship, trimming 
their analytical sails before even testing the direction and velocity of the political winds. (There 
have also been occasions, of course, when the Secretariat has exaggerated risks and potential 
casualties.)
9 The reasons for this delay are discussed in Edward C. Luck, “Roots of Ambivalence: The United Nations, Genocide, and 
Mass Atrocity Prevention,” in Policies and Practices for Preventing Atrocities, eds. Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff 
(London: Routledge, forthcoming).
10 Tellingly, genocide prevention and mass atrocity prevention—the latter under the rubric of R2P--were among the last 
entries in a long list of human protection concerns adopted by the UN. They were preceded, among other concerns, 
by humanitarian assistance, internal displacement, children and armed conflict, sexual and gender-based violence, 
women, peace, and security, and civilian protection in peacekeeping contexts. See Chapter One of Alex J. Bellamy and 
Edward C. Luck, The Responsibility to Protect: From Promise to Practice (Cambridge, UK: Polity Books, forthcoming).   
11 United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, August 21, 2000 (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809).
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The long tradition of blaming the Member States for every UN failing has done little to enhance 
understanding of how to improve the organization’s performance, especially in areas, such as 
atrocity prevention, in which the Secretariat could, and often does, play a major operational role. 
The Security Council’s growing willingness to hear from the Secretariat—and, in informal settings, 
from civil society—about potential atrocity crimes has been an important step forward, but much 
more could be done in the future to make this a more regular feature of Secretariat-Member State 
collaboration.12 Little attention, for instance, has been given to the roles the General Assembly, the 
Peacebuilding Commission, and the Human Rights Council could play in forwarding the atrocity 
prevention agenda.   
Though the Assembly, under Article 12 (1) of the Charter, may not make recommendations 
on matters being addressed by the Council, it may discuss or investigate any matter. It has, for 
instance, passed several pointed resolutions on Syria, reflecting broad frustration among the 
Member States about the blockages within the Council on the situation.13 Under the Uniting for 
Peace formula, the Assembly has a long history of authorizing peace operations under Chapter 
VI of the Charter.14 Though such operations would not have an enforcement mandate, they might 
play a useful function as preventive deployments in places where there are real possibilities of 
instability and atrocity crimes. Under Article 11 (3) of the Charter, the Assembly has the equivalent 
of Article 99 authority for referring threats to the Council. As noted earlier, the Assembly has been 
the locus for efforts to refine R2P and to build broader Member State support for it. But it has 
also been the forum for frustrating attempts to gain the human and financial resources needed to 
mount a proper and sustainable effort to prevent atrocity crimes. For instance, a small minority in 
the Assembly’s Fifth Committee has been able—or allowed—to repeatedly block the provision of 
even very modest capacities to implement R2P, despite its endorsement at the highest levels at the 
2005 World Summit. 
As noted above, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was originally conceived as an inter-
governmental body that could deal with countries either sliding into or emerging from conflict. It 
was established as a subsidiary advisory body both of the General Assembly and of the Security 
Council.15 Though its pre-conflict function was dropped, it could still have a preventive role in 
helping societies that had suffered sectarian violence from repeating the cycle. This could be a 
significant preventive measure, as it has long been said that the best predictor of genocide is past 
genocide. In its country-specific configuration, the PBC could potentially help draw economic 
and political resources to situations of atrocity concern that have not received much international 
attention. In practice, however, there has been relatively little overlap between the countries on 
which the PBC has focused and those of highest priority from an atrocity prevention viewpoint. 
As a 2015 review of the PBC underscored, for a variety of political and institutional reasons, it has 
not been able to realize its potential for strategic leadership or for bridging the gaps between the 
Security Council and the General Assembly.16
The Geneva-based Human Rights Council came rather late to the R2P debate for both political 
and geographical reasons. However, the Council’s Commissions of Inquiry on the Democratic 
12 Alex J. Bellamy, “UN Security Council,” in Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, eds. Alex J. Bellamy and Tim 
Dunne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 249-268; Edward C. Luck, “Prospects for Institutional Renovation and 
Reform,” in The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, 2nd ed., eds. Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, forthcoming).
13 The General Assembly, for instance, authorized the creation of a mechanism to investigate the alleged commission of 
atrocity crimes in Syria. United Nations, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 21 December 2016 (UN Doc. A/
RES/71/248).
14 Dominik Zaum, “The Security Council, the General Assembly, and War: The Uniting for Peace Resolution,” in The 
United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice Since 1945, eds. Vaughan Lowe, et al. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 154-174.
15 United Nations, General Assembly Resolution (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1180); United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1645 
on Post-conflict Peacebuilding, 2005 (UN Doc. 1645).
16 United Nations, Identical Letters Dated 29 June 2015 from the Chair of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the 
Peacebuilding Architecture Addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, June 
30, 2015 (UN Doc. A/69/968-S/2015/490); United Nations, The Challenge of Sustaining Peace, Report of the Advisory 
Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture, June 30, 2015 (UN Doc. A/69/968-S/2015/490).
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People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and on Syria have both been outspoken about the growing 
evidence of mass atrocity crimes, and the former invoked R2P and called on the international 
community to address the dire human protection situation in the DPRK more vigorously.17 In late 
2016, the Russian Federation failed to be elected by the General Assembly to membership in the 
Human Rights Council, purportedly because of widespread concerns about the commission of 
atrocity crimes in Syria.18 From the passage by the General Assembly of the Genocide Convention 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights a day apart in 1948, these two agendas have 
followed parallel, not convergent, paths.19 Mutual respect and common purpose have been 
combined with a sense of ambiguity and even ambivalence about the relationship between atrocity 
crimes and human rights.20 In terms of implementation, the relatively large Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva and its much smaller cousin addressing genocide 
prevention and R2P in New York have tended to have distinct perspectives on reporting and 
institutional matters, even as they generally have viewed specific situations from similar but not 
congruent perspectives.21 It was this author’s experience that the human rights conditions in a 
country were not always indicative of its proclivity to mass violence. Some chronic human rights 
violators were relatively stable, while some societies that were not among the worst violators, such 
as Kenya and Kyrgyzstan, nevertheless witnessed sudden violence and atrocity crimes. 
The pursuit of human rights is not the only seemingly natural partner for atrocity prevention 
in which the relationship has had dysfunctional elements. In the case of humanitarian affairs, the 
differences have run deeper, based on divergent conceptual and political assumptions that are 
not easily reconciled. R2P, in particular, has not been embraced by many in the humanitarian 
community because of its inclusion of the use of coercive military force as a response option 
in extreme situations. As Hugo Slim has put it, the concerns of humanitarian actors about the 
third pillar of the Secretary-General’s R2P implementation strategy “focus on four issues: the 
politicization of civilian protection; raised expectations that tend to freeze conflicts and postpone 
peace-making; the likely failure of force and the widening of conflict; and the contamination of 
humanitarian agencies by association.”22 
From an atrocity prevention or R2P perspective, the emphasis in humanitarian principles on 
maintaining impartiality and preserving humanitarian space and access may entail prioritizing the 
cultivation of good relations with the very regimes that may be committing or planning to commit 
mass atrocities against their populations. These differences came to a head in the shaping of the 
UN Secretariat’s response—the Security Council largely stayed on the sidelines--to the mounting 
violence targeted at civilians in the concluding phases of the civil war in Sri Lanka in late 2008-early 
2009. It was decided at the upper reaches of the Secretariat that the situation should be framed as a 
humanitarian emergency, with the Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Office for Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) put in charge. R2P and genocide prevention perspectives were 
17 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, February 7, 2014 (UN Doc. A/HRC/25/63) and Detailed Findings (UN Doc. A/HRC/25/CRP.1). 
18 It is highly unusual for one of the five permanent members of the Security Council to lose such a vote. Julian Borger, 
“Russia Denied Membership of UN Human Rights Council,” The Guardian, 28 October 2016.
19 It took several decades for human rights to gain a solid foothold in the UN Secretariat, and the first UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights was not appointed until 1993, 45 years after the Universal Declaration. Genocide 
prevention took even longer, not gaining any presence in the Secretariat until 2004, as discussed below.
20 For largely historical reasons, the ten human rights treaty bodies addressed by the Human Rights Council do not 
include the Genocide Convention. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, Status of the Human Rights Treaty 
Body System, July 18, 2016 (UN Doc. A/71/118), 2, para. 1. For the negotiating history of the Genocide Convention and 
the singular role of Raphael Lemkin, see James Waller, Confronting Evil: Engaging the Responsibility to Prevent Genocide 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 15-23 and Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell:” America and the Age of 
Genocide (New York: Harper Collins, 2002), 51-60. For a discussion of the reluctance of the UN founders to embrace 
genocide or atrocity prevention, see Luck, Roots of Ambivalence.
21 The appointment in 2010 of an Assistant Secretary-General to head the High Commissioner’s office in New York has 
enhanced the opportunities for collaboration.
22 Hugo Slim, “Saving Individuals from the Scourge of War: Complementarity and Tension between R2P and 
Humanitarian Action,” in Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, eds. Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016), 555.
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not welcome in the deliberations, reports of mounting human rights violations were dismissed, 
and the UN’s voice was muted as the war crimes unfolded.23
The internal review of the organization’s failures in the Sri Lankan crisis was candid about its 
shortcomings and pointed to a number of areas needing improvement. The primary institutional 
response was the enunciation of the Rights Up Front Action Plan by Secretary-General Ban in 
September 2013.24 The Plan had many positive elements, including the development of more 
coherent and streamlined means of collecting and integrating information on serious human 
rights violations into crisis response planning at UN headquarters. From an atrocity prevention 
perspective, however, the results have been more mixed. The differences in perspective between 
the humanitarian and atrocity prevention views of the crisis in Sri Lanka were finessed rather than 
confronted.  
As Andrew Gilmour, at the time a key official in the Office of the Secretary-General and now 
Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights in New York, put it: “those involved in formulating 
the initiative avoided getting into what was seen as an unproductive debate on the distinction 
between the ‘protection of civilians’ and the ‘protection of human rights,’ as Rights up Front is 
committed to both.”25 He goes on to note the common emphasis in Rights Up Front and R2P on 
prevention and to underscore the concerns of some Member States with the possibility of using force 
under an R2P banner.26 Though the use of force was never a desirable or feasible alternative in Sri 
Lanka, the 1999 reports on the UN’s failures to act in a timely and decisive manner in the Rwandan 
genocide and the massacre at Srebrenica highlighted the consequences of the UN’s reluctance to 
take decisive military action when atrocity crimes were unfolding and it was a feasible option.27
The Rights Up Front initiative had significant implications, as well, for decision-making in 
the upper echelons of the Secretariat. A Senior Action Group (SAG) was established, chaired by 
the Deputy Secretary-General, to review a range of ongoing crises and to insure that human rights 
perspectives were taken into account. Though probably a net positive for atrocity prevention, 
SAG added little in those cases in which violence was not necessarily preceded by an escalation 
of human rights abuses. It also helped to ease the demise of the Policy Committee, a high-level 
group that had been chaired by the Secretary-General and that permitted more opportunities 
for his Special Advisers to present the case for addressing particular situations from an atrocity 
prevention perspective. This author’s experience suggests that there are risks in imposing any 
barriers to the direct access of those mandated to prevent atrocity crimes to the Secretary-General 
or in creating distance between the Secretary-General and his/her personal responsibility for acting 
to try to prevent such crimes.28 That, after all, should have been one of the primary lessons from 
Sri Lanka.
23 The report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel on UN Action in Sri Lanka of November 2012 was never 
published, but it can be found on line (with some sections redacted). Also see Kimberly Nackers, “Framing the 
Responsibility to Protect in the 2009 Sri Lanka Civil War,” Global Responsibility to Protect 7, no. 1 (2015), 81-108; 
Kimberly Nackers, “Sri Lanka,” in Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, eds. Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 876-894; Damien Kingsbury, “Sri Lanka,” in The Responsibility to Protect: The 
Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time, eds. Jared Genser and Irwin Cotler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 298-315; Edward C. Luck and Dana Zaret Luck, “The Individual Responsibility to Protect,” in Reconstructing 
Atrocity Prevention, eds. Sheri P. Rosenberg, Tibi Galis, and Alex Zucker  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2016), 237-242.
24 The “Rights Up Front” Detailed Action Plan prepared by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, dated March 2014, 
is available online, though it is marked as an internal document. For a highly favorable view, see Gerrit Kurtz, With 
Courage and Coherence: The Human Rights Up Front Initiative of the United Nations, (Berlin: Global Public Policy Institute, 
July 2015).
25 Andrew Gilmour, “The Future of Human Rights: A View from the United Nations,” Ethics & International Affairs, 28, no. 
2 (2014), 240-241.
26 Ibid., 246-247.
27 United Nations, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 
December 16, 1999 (UN Doc. S/1999/1257); United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General 
Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, November 15, 1999 (UN Doc. A/54/549).
28 The author introduced the notion of an Individual Responsibility to Protect (IR2P) into the Secretary-General’s 2009 R2P 
implementation strategy. The concept is explained at greater length in Luck and Luck, The Individual Responsibility to 
Protect.
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Another potential asset—the presence of UN peacekeepers on the ground—has proven to be 
a mixed blessing. The record has been inconsistent. In Rwanda, Srebrenica, Sierra Leone, Darfur, 
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), mass atrocities occurred despite the presence 
of UN forces. A moral hazard can be created when the promise of protection is not matched by 
commensurate action by those institutions and countries with the capacity to offer protection, as 
with the Security Council’s declaration of safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina.29 Yet in Mozambique, 
Cambodia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali, the blue helmets 
helped to prevent mass atrocities or their reoccurrence. In Kenya (twice), Kyrgyzstan, and Guinea 
(Conakry), preventive efforts prevailed without an international force on the ground. In South 
Sudan, peacekeepers have provided shelter for hundreds of thousands of civilians even as mass 
atrocities escalated elsewhere.  
Given this mottled history, it is not surprising that the United Nations has developed distinct, 
if related, doctrines for the protection of civilians (POC) in a peacekeeping context and for mass 
atrocity prevention and R2P.30 Those in charge of peacekeeping at the UN have tended to be quite 
cautious about R2P for both political and conceptual reasons and about adding atrocity prevention 
tasks to already ambitious mandates for over-stretched peacekeeping operations.31 The United 
Nations, at this point, does not have a well-developed doctrine for the use of force, with or without 
consent, for the explicit purpose of protecting civilians from atrocities or of deterring such crimes.32 
It has relatively few cases from which to draw lessons and these scattered experiences have been 
quite disparate. As Paul Williams puts it, “while it is understandable that the main practitioners of 
POC (UN peacekeepers and the Secretariat) would like this agenda to remain as uncontroversial as 
possible, pretending that these mandates can ignore the four R2P crimes or that they do not arise 
from a similar sentiment as R2P-inspired military intervention is not helpful.  Avoidance is not the 
solution.”33
This conceptual muddle has not been simplified or clarified by the growing recognition that 
non-state armed groups are—and have long been—among the more virulent perpetrators of atrocity 
crimes. In 2008, when this author was Special Adviser, he introduced armed groups, including 
those practicing terrorism, into the UN’s R2P lexicon, which previously had focused entirely on 
governments as the sole perpetrators.34 Now, however, there is a real danger that concerns about 
preventing mass atrocity crimes could be distorted or overwhelmed by the much larger narrative 
and more widely embraced policy agenda on counter-terrorism. It is not entirely reassuring, in that 
regard, that the first time that a Security Council meeting directly addressed R2P was in a counter-
terrorism context or that the Secretary-General’s 2015 report on conflict prevention included a 
29 On moral hazard, see Alan J. Kuperman, “The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans,” 
International Studies Quarterly, 52, no. 1 (March 2008), 49-80. On safe areas, see Phil Orchard, “Revisiting Humanitarian 
Safe Areas for Civilian Protection,” Global Governance, 20 (2014), 55-75.
30 Paul D. Williams, “The R2P, Protection of Civilians, and UN Peacekeeping Operations,” in Oxford Handbook of the 
Responsibility to Protect, eds. Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 524-544.
31 Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the able Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations from 2000-2008, has asserted 
that talk about possible humanitarian intervention had made it more difficult to obtain consent to a more traditional 
peacekeeping deployment in Darfur and that the use of force in Libya had stiffened Chinese and Russian resistance 
to effective action in Syria. He also argues, unconvincingly from this author’s experience, that those countries 
favoring R2P are less likely to commit forces than those taking a more negative stance in the annual R2P debates in 
the General Assembly. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, The Fog of Peace: A Memoir of International Peacekeeping in the 21st Century 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2015), 186, 286, 310, and 305, respectively.
32 Nevertheless, since the Secretary-General’s first report on R2P in early 2009, the Security Council has authorized 
robust military enforcement measures at least in part for human protection purposes in six situations (all in Africa): 
Côte d’Ivoire (resolutions 1933 (2010), 1962 (2010), 1967 (2011), and 1975 (2011)); Libya (resolution 1973 (2011)); Mali 
(resolution 2100 (2013)); CAR (resolution 2127 (2013)); DRC (resolutions 2098 (2013) and 2147 (2014)); and South 
Sudan (resolutions 2206 (2015) and 2304 (2016)).
33 Williams, The R2P, Protection of Civilians, 539.
34 Edward C. Luck, “From Promise to Practice: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,” in The Responsibility to Protect, 
eds. Jared Genser and Irwin Cotler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 85-106. On the statist orientation of the 
original conception of R2P, see Luck and Luck, Individual Responsibility.
Luck
©2018      Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, no. 3 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1516
40
section on “Violent Extremism and Atrocity Crimes.”35
The mother of all muddles, however, has been the UN’s conflation of conflict prevention 
and atrocity prevention.36 When Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed the world body’s first 
post and action plan to prevent genocide in 2004, to mark the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan 
genocide, he apparently had no inter-governmental mandate to do so. Instead, he cited a Security 
Council resolution on conflict prevention, which responded to his report on conflict prevention. 
Neither document addressed the matter of atrocity or genocide prevention, despite the two mea 
culpa reports in 1999 on the organization’s failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica.37 For the UN, the 
temptation to make atrocity prevention a subset of conflict prevention and resolution can be 
overwhelming. The Charter has countless references to preventing and resolving conflicts and, 
as noted above, not one to genocide or mass atrocities. The UN—both its Secretariat and its inter-
governmental organs—is highly sophisticated and experienced in the former and little more than 
a novice in the latter. As they say, when your only tool is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. 
This would apply as much in the UN context to peaceful settlement as it does to the use of force in 
the US government.  
Though it is undoubtedly true that more atrocities occur within armed conflicts than outside of 
them, experience has shown that horrific atrocities have occurred in a number of situations without 
armed conflict. During the period when the author was Special Adviser, these cases included, 
among others, Kenya (twice), Guinea (Conakry), and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the early stages of the 
violence in Libya and Syria. The etiology of mass atrocity crimes may sometimes include armed 
conflict, but that explains neither why atrocity crimes do not occur in all armed conflicts nor why 
they often take place in other circumstances. Prevention, therefore, demands a broader yet more 
dedicated understanding of the origins, course, termination, and possible reoccurrence of atrocity 
crimes. The very process of conflict resolution may tempt one or more parties to resort to the 
commission of atrocities to undermine the potential peace settlement, as may have been the case in 
both Rwanda and Srebrenica.
Conflating conflict prevention and atrocity prevention presents challenges for practice as well 
as for understanding and doctrine. For those engaged in mediation, keeping doors to the parties 
open will generally be perceived as more important than relaying uncomfortable messages about 
possible atrocity crimes. It was this author’s experience that warnings from UN headquarters to 
parties in a conflict about behavior that was troubling from an atrocity prevention perspective 
were sometimes seen by SRSGs in the field and officials of the Department of Political Affairs in 
New York as too pointed or untimely. Governments are never eager to be told that their supporters 
or armed forces are committing atrocities, especially when they are facing armed opposition and 
their grip on power is threatened.  
Sometimes quiet diplomacy, especially by the Secretary-General and/or senior regional 
figures, can make a difference in preventing atrocities, especially when the regime is divided or 
not fully committed to a genocidal project and the message is given relatively early. As noted 
above, the advent of the ICC has added a critical talking point about the decline of impunity 
and possible personal consequences for leaders in such situations, but that message tends to fall 
on deaf ears when the targeted leadership already sees the struggle in existential terms, has the 
backing of a permanent member of the Security Council, or the atrocities are being committed 
by extremist armed groups. From a conflict resolution perspective, however, the invocation of 
35 United Nations Security Council, Arria Formula Meeting on the Responsibility to Protect and Non-State Actors, December 14, 
2015. The statement by this author is available on the web site of the Global Centre on the Responsibility to Protect. 
United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations and Conflict Prevention: A Collective Recommitment, 
September 25, 2015 (UN Doc. S/2015/730), 9, paras., 32-34.
36 Alex J. Bellamy, “Operationalizing the ‘Atrocity Prevention Lens’: Making Prevention a Living Reality,” in Reconstructing 
Atrocity Prevention, eds. Sheri P. Rosenberg, Tibi Galis, and Alex Zucker (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2016), 67-69; Ruben Reike, “Conflict Prevention and R2P,” in Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, eds. 
Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 581-603; Edward C. Luck, “Getting There, 
Being There,” in Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, eds. Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 297-299.
37 Luck, Getting There, Being There, 294-296.
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possible post-conflict ICC referrals may be regarded as a deterrent to a peaceful settlement that 
could leave leaders vulnerable to prosecution. In sum, when conflict prevention and atrocity 
prevention narratives converge, they can be mutually reinforcing, but often quite the opposite has 
been the case.
Implications
As the foregoing discussion underscores, the fact that the United Nations is pursuing so many 
related agendas simultaneously presents both opportunities and challenges for atrocity prevention 
efforts. There is no shortage of symbiotic possibilities, both in the field and at headquarters. But 
it is difficult to pursue so many policy streams at the same time and in the same place, as policy 
coherence tends to be far more difficult to achieve than surface-level coordination. Early warning, 
in this author’s experience, is much less of a problem than assessment and framing. Policy makers 
with different responsibilities are likely to read the same information flows in distinct ways. What 
are the frameworks and patterns within which policy makers understand, sort, and prioritize 
the information before them? Why was Rwanda framed chiefly as a matter of implementing the 
Arusha accords rather than of preventing a massive genocide? Why was it believed that Serbian 
forces would not test the Security Council’s will to enforce the safe areas it had established? Why 
was Sri Lanka regarded as a primarily humanitarian matter? And why were the early responses 
to the growing violence in Syria couched as a question of regime change rather than as a question 
of changing regime behavior and addressing the longer-term risks of mass atrocities, including 
against the ruling largely Alawite minority? Can atrocity prevention perspectives, given their 
chronically weak institutional positions, even get a voice at the key decision-making tables?
In this regard, the question of mainstreaming R2P and genocide prevention concerns presents 
risks as well as opportunities. In his final report on R2P, Secretary-General Ban was anything but 
ambivalent. The United Nations,” he asserted, “must redouble its own efforts to mainstream the 
responsibility to protect. Faced with mounting challenges on multiple fronts, business as usual 
will not be sufficient.”38 The common theme from the multiple reviews of related UN work in 
2015-2016, he underscored, was prevention. Fair enough, but the price of gaining the benefits of 
wider institutional visibility and greater conceptual coherence cannot be that atrocity prevention 
becomes just part of the bureaucratic checklist of other, more robust, institutional mandates.  In the 
process of mainstreaming, it is essential that the singular perspective of atrocity prevention not be 
lost. The goal must not be the typical bureaucratic blending of messages—for which the UN is well 
known--but to maintain a distinctive and sometimes obnoxious voice for the prevention of mass 
atrocities. It has been—and will continue to be—hard to have it both ways. 
Finding a distinct voice can be particularly difficult at the stage of structural prevention, 
when states under stress are not yet at a crisis point. As this author commented in 2001, in the 
context of conflict prevention, structural prevention strategies can confront a “dilemma of 
comprehensiveness” in which so many factors are perceived as potentially relevant that there is no 
basis for coherent priority setting or policy making.39 If everything is critical, then nothing is.  More 
recently, the UN’s joint office on genocide prevention and R2P developed a Framework of Analysis 
for Atrocity Crimes that is being employed with increasing frequency around the UN system.40 As 
a checklist, it has some merit. But, with 14 risk factors and 143 indicators, the Framework does not 
provide a clear basis for determining the relative weight of the various factors and indicators. Most 
importantly, it lacks a dynamic dimension and a sense of which of these elements matter the most 
in which situations. For those decision makers charged with making quick and critical decisions 
in situations of acute concern, an over-reliance on such generic lists or templates could lead to the 
overlooking of those characteristics that make each situation unique.  
38 United Nations Secretary-General, Mobilizing Collective Action, 17, para. 60.
39 Edward C. Luck, “Prevention: Theory and Practice,” in From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN 
System, eds. Fen Osler Hampson and David Malone (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 256. Bellamy, Operationalizing the 
‘Atrocity Prevention’ Lens, 65-66.
40 United Nations Secretary-General, Mobilizing Collective Action, 12, para. 41.
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For these reasons, it is understandable that policy makers tend to put a premium on operational 
over structural prevention. Early engagement with societies under stress can be helpful for 
developing familiarity with the local dynamics and for gaining a modicum of mutual trust. Being 
engaged, however, is not the same thing as making a difference when push comes to shove. Mass 
atrocities are not spontaneous events. They require some degree of planning and mobilization, 
flowing from a series of destructive choices over time. The United Nations, regional arrangements, 
neighbors, influential governments, and civil society need to recognize opportunities to interrupt 
and disrupt such a chain of decisions and actions before they become irreversible. Some regimes 
and armed groups, of course, are determined to take such a course and cannot be dissuaded. 
Others, however, are reachable and perhaps persuadable through some combination of reason, 
carrots, and credible sticks. Local partners can be invaluable, particularly from civil society, media, 
clergy, the private sector, and parliaments. Where no such partners can be engaged because of 
the authoritarian or totalitarian nature of the political and security systems, as in Syria or the 
DPRK, respectively, then external actors have much less to work with and less chance of making 
a difference.
In all of this, getting the framing right is essential. That is why this author based the Secretary-
General’s R2P implementation strategy on the premise of “early and flexible response tailored to 
the specific needs of each situation.”41 That is also why efforts to smooth out R2P’s rough edges 
so that it can blend better with other UN mandates pose the risk of missing the most valuable 
and distinctive elements of atrocity prevention work. This was not meant to be a comfortable, 
inoffensive quest. Crafting the most productive conceptual and working relationships between 
atrocity prevention and its conflict prevention, peacekeeping, human rights, and humanitarian 
cousins may take some time. As even Goldilocks discovered, it takes patience to find the right fit. 
But the effort is worth it.
How these conceptual, doctrinal, and institutional matters are resolved will matter far beyond 
the confines of the world body. As discussed earlier, the UN’s unmatched political legitimacy and 
legal authority mean that what it does and does not do, where it does or does not speak out, matter 
much more than its deficits in material capacities would suggest. It is not a marginal player when it 
comes to atrocity prevention, in operational as well as normative terms, because of its catalytic role 
in encouraging regional and sub-regional bodies, governments, and civil society to step up when 
atrocities are threatened and societies are under stress. Each time the UN fails to utilize its voice or 
to try to make a difference, it feeds cynicism about the prospects for preventing mass atrocities and 
makes such crimes appear to be normal, if not acceptable. The world body, in that regard, has an 
enduring obligation to keep hope alive.   
When costs and risks are high, the UN may have trouble rousing others to action, especially 
when its own Security Council is divided. But it has a responsibility to try to make a difference. 
Time has shown that the absence of its voice can be deafening when it decides to look the other 
way, as in Cambodia, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka. Each of its absences from the struggle for prevention, 
just as its operational shortcomings, tends to undermine both its moral authority/legitimacy and 
the strength of the norms, purposes, and principles for which it stands. In atrocity prevention, 
people and governments expect the UN to demonstrate moral and political leadership. And they 
notice when it fails to do so.
Remedies
Any honest enumeration of lessons learned about how to do atrocity prevention better is bound to 
be both short and speculative. The base of experience is recent and scattered. Trying to prevent mass 
atrocities is a recent endeavor, whether by governments, international institutions, or civil society. 
The United Nations did not even begin to articulate a strategy—and that just to prevent genocide—
until 2004.  Not surprisingly, the learning curve has proven to be quite steep. No one who has tried 
to curb atrocities could ever claim it to be an easy or assured task.  We are still learning how to do it. 
It is essential to retain a profound sense of modesty about what has been accomplished and about 
41 United Nations, Secretary-General Defends, Clarifies ‘Responsibility to Protect’ at Berlin Event on ‘Responsible Sovereignty: 
International Cooperation for A Changed World,” July 15, 2008 (UN Doc. SG/SM/11701).  
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what future prospects look like. Vulnerable populations should not expect the United Nations to 
be anything close to a miracle worker, as it has at best proven to be a sometimes partner and/or 
catalyst to prevention and, less often, to protection.  
R2P, in this author’s view, offered two essential elements, both of which remain works in 
progress. One was to underscore that the prevention of atrocity crimes imposes both individual 
and collective responsibilities. Neither side of this equation will get far without the other. Notions 
of collective responsibility bring collective action problems. As the UN illustrates all too well, in 
this and most other areas, collective undertakings offer myriad opportunities for passing the buck. 
Nevertheless, as noted at the outset, there is reason to believe that the unique political legitimacy 
and legal authority offered by the United Nations and other inter-governmental bodies outweigh 
the collective action dilemmas that multilateral approaches to problem-solving entail. Only 
occasionally do other, more unilateral, avenues offer feasible and sustainable alternatives. The 
collective action dilemmas associated with genocide prevention and R2P at the world body led this 
author to emphasize the need for a parallel assumption of an individual responsibility to protect.42 
As discussed above, the Secretariat can, and often has, acted without specific mandates from the 
Security Council or other inter-governmental organs. Obviously, the best chance of making a 
difference is when both individual and collective responsibilities are triggered at the UN and it has 
willing partners at the regional, national, and local levels.
The second essential element offered by R2P was the possibility of drawing much broader 
public, political, and media interest to prevention and protection issues. The fact that the assembled 
heads of state and government at the 2005 World Summit endorsed R2P at a time when they could 
not agree on many other matters was, in and of itself, quite remarkable. The Secretary-General’s 
2009 implementation report generated the longest debate on any question in the General Assembly 
that year, and there have been reports and Assembly debates (informal interactive dialogues) every 
year since. The Security Council has referred to R2P in 62  resolutions as of June 2017, with the 
frequency actually accelerating since the controversies over the use of force in Libya in 2011.43 The 
academic and policy literature on R2P seems endless.  
Much of the commentary has, naturally, been critical, but the essential point is that the advent 
of R2P has undoubtedly spurred far more attention and analysis to the question of how to prevent 
atrocity crimes and protect populations than had been achieved over the more than a half century 
between the agreement on the Genocide Convention in 1948 and the ICISS report introducing 
R2P in 2001. Whether that momentum is sustainable, however, remains an open question. The 
progress with parliamentarians has been decidedly uneven and sporadic, and the discouraging 
developments in Syria, Yemen, and South Sudan appear to have had a dampening effect. As of 
spring 2017, 59  governments had appointed R2P focal points, but there is little uniformity in their 
backgrounds or assignments.44 It may be that too much of the action has been at the UN in New 
York and too little in national capitals.
Atrocity prevention and R2P continue to be much more political than technical or institutional 
challenges, though progress on the latter could affect political calculations about what is possible 
and what the associated costs and risks of engagement are likely to be. Among the steps that could 
be helpful at this point would be:
• Assigning a higher priority to identifying, discouraging, and disrupting incitement.
• Developing global, regional, and national doctrine and capacities for preventive 
deployments of peacekeepers and monitors in countries under stress, such as was done in 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Burundi.
• Revisiting the initial conception of the PBC as an inter-governmental body concerned with 
situations under stress and sliding towards conflict and possible atrocities as well as those 
42 Luck and Luck, The Individual Responsibility to Protect.
43 This number is drawn from the web site of the Global Centre for R2P, which maintains a running list of the relevant 
resolution texts. The Centre counts R2P references in 17 statements—PRSTs—by the President of the Council as well. 
The International Coalition for R2P also tracks the Council references on its web site.
44 For updates, see the web site of the Global Centre for R2P, which acts as the secretariat for the focal points network.
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emerging from conflict.
• Reviving the convening function given to the Special Advisers for Genocide Prevention 
and for R2P in the Secretary-General’s 2010 report on early warning and assessment.45
• Initiating joint UN/African Union and UN/European Union assessments of lessons learned 
from past efforts to prevent mass atrocities and of ways to enhance their collaboration 
in operational prevention efforts in the future, including responding to incitement and 
undertaking preventive deployments individually or jointly.
• Preparing a report by Secretary-General Guterres on how atrocity prevention fits 
thematically, operationally, and institutionally into his announced intention to prioritize 
prevention strategies in the work of the United Nations.
None of these or similar steps could make much difference, however, without a more far-reaching 
reassessment of the UN’s institutional culture when it comes to preventing atrocities and protecting 
populations. Despite three wrenching mea culpa reports on Rwanda, Srebrenica, and Sri Lanka, 
there remains a deep-seated resistance in the Secretariat and among the Member States to absorbing 
the hard lessons of those fundamental failures. There have been two entrenched assumptions: one, 
that the UN’s natural and proper stance towards parties should be one of impartiality and two, that 
the use of force should always be a last resort. Neither assumption, in this author’s view, conforms 
with the provisions or spirit of the Charter. Each has its place, but should not be applied uniformly, 
especially when the risk of mass atrocities appears high and imminent.
The 2015 report of the Secretary-General on conflict prevention properly heralds the value 
of impartiality for providing “access to a diverse number of stakeholders with whom we can 
build trust and engage.”46 But it goes too far in asserting that the UN’s unique role stems from 
“impartiality and the legitimacy derived from the principles of the Charter.”47 In fact, the Charter 
never uses the term “impartiality” or anything similar, as this is an attribute for conflict resolution, 
not a founding principle of the organization. There are times when the UN should be impartial 
and others when it needs to take sides.  To avoid the League of Nations’ debilitating shortage 
of will and capacity, the founders of the UN did their best to prepare it to organize resistance 
to aggression. In his report on The Fall of Srebrenica, Secretary-General Annan criticized the “the 
general tendency to assume that the parties were equally responsible for the transgressions that 
occurred,” which led to negotiations with those planning and executing atrocities that “amounted 
to appeasement.”48 He faulted the “institutional ideology of impartiality even when confronted 
with attempted genocide.”49 And he concluded that “the men who have been charged with this 
crime against humanity reminded the world and, in particular, the United Nations, that evil exists 
in the world. They taught us also that the United Nations global commitment to ending conflict 
does not preclude moral judgements, but makes them necessary.”50
The founders would also be surprised to learn that it has become customary at the UN to 
assert that the use of force should always be a last resort. That is far from what they had in mind 
in crafting the Charter. In preparing the Secretary-General’s 2009 strategy for implementing R2P, 
this author used the phrase “measure of last resort” instead. This was meant to convey the notion 
that force was not a preferred tool, given its costs, risks, and consequences, but that it should not be 
relegated to consideration as a final, desperate, alternative when all else has failed.  The stance of 
some Member States and members of the Secretariat that force should be regarded as a last resort 
in a sequential or chronological manner runs counter to the goal of protecting populations and 
to Secretary-General Ban’s early and flexible response strategy. Regarding the latter, Secretary-
General Annan’s report took his predecessor to task for speaking “against a ‘culture of death’” 
45 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General (as drafted by this author), Early Warning, Assessment and the 
Responsibility to Protect, July 14, 2010 (UN Doc. A/64/864), 7, para. 18.
46 United Nations, United Nations and Conflict Prevention, 4, para. 12.
47 Ibid.
48 United Nations, Fall of Srebrenica, 107, paras. 496 and 500.
49 Ibid., 108, para. 505.
50 Ibid., 108, para. 506.
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and for “arguing that peace should be pursued only through non-military methods.”51 He 
acknowledged that “errors of judgement were made—errors rooted in a philosophy of impartiality 
and non-violence wholly unsuited to the conflict in Bosnia.”52 And he pointed to “the pervasive 
ambivalence within the United Nations regarding the role of force in the pursuit of peace.”53  
More than two decades after these horrific failures to protect, the debate over R2P illustrates 
how deeply these inhibitions continue to affect the effort to articulate and implement an effective 
UN strategy for curbing mass atrocities. For instance, Brazil’s ‘responsibility while protecting’ 
(RWP) proposal, whatever its other merits, would have imposed both a sequenced approach 
to R2P implementation and a series of standards for Security Council authorization for the use 
of force in stopping atrocities that do not exist for the Council’s employment of force for other 
purposes.54 That approach certainly would not have been among the lessons drawn from Rwanda 
and Srebrenica.
Given these multiple obstacles, some imposed and others self-generated, it is striking that the 
United Nations has had any success at all in helping to prevent mass atrocities. It has undoubtedly 
underperformed, but its assets, particularly in terms of legitimacy and authority, are both real and 
sustainable. There are unrealized capacities on the Secretariat side and the Member States could do 
much more if they had greater confidence that their investments in the world body would pay off 
and if they generally placed a higher priority on preventing atrocities and protecting populations. If 
there is good news about unrealized potential, it is that there are substantial opportunities waiting 
to be pursued. At every level—individual, local, national, regional, and global—curbing atrocities 
is a relatively new enterprise that could take decades to nurture and develop. Possible synergies 
abound. It is time to stop pointing fingers, to start taking responsibility, and to get to work on 
building the kind of partnerships that could make a real difference over time.  
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